http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/72942/index.do 
Warnock v. The Queen (July 24, 2014 – 2014 TCC 240 ) was a decision dealing with whether the taxpayer was entitled to medical tax credits for surrogacy expenses:
[1] This appeal by Kirstin Warnock concerns a medical expense tax credit claimed for expenses incurred with respect to a surrogacy arrangement to enable the appellant and her spouse to have a child. The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the 2011 taxation year to allow some of the expenses and to disallow others.
[2] The appellant claimed the credit with respect to three types of services: (1) medical services provided directly to the appellant, (2) medical services provided directly to the surrogate, Penny Warnock, who is the appellant’s sister-in-law, and (3) legal expenses related to a mandatory surrogacy contract.
[3] The appellant appeals in respect of the disallowed amounts, which are $2,861.88 for legal services, $696.00 for ultrasound tests for the surrogate, and $318.88 for prescription drugs for the surrogate.
The court held that the appellant was not entitled to credits for any of the expenses claimed essentially since she was not the “patient” for the purposes of the medical tax credit provisions:
[14] It is not necessary for purposes of this appeal to decide whether an embryo is an “organ.” The problem is that the person receiving the transplant is not the appellant but the surrogate. The surrogate is not a patient, as defined.
[15] Subsection 118.2(2)(l.1) requires that a “patient” need a transplant. The term “patient” is defined in s. 118.2(2)(a), above, to mean the individual who is claiming the tax credit, or a spouse or a dependant. In this case, it is the surrogate who received the transplant and she is not a “patient,” as required by s. 118.2(2)(l.1).
[16] In the unreported Carlson decision, Justice Archambault decided that this provision was not intended to apply to surrogacy arrangements. I agree with this conclusion.
[17] Turning to the appellant’s expenses for ultrasound tests and prescription drugs for the surrogate, I have a similar problem with these expenses. The relevant provisions, s. 118.2(2)(n) and (o), above, both refer to a “patient.” Parliament’s intent, in my view, is that these types of services must be prescribed for the “patient,” as defined. In this case, the surrogate is not a patient.
[18] For these reasons, I have concluded that the relevant provisions do not apply to the expenses that are at issue. Although the circumstances of this case are sympathetic, the appeal should be dismissed.